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ABSTRACT
Canonical models of crime emphasize economic incentives. Yet, causal evidence of sorting into 
criminal occupations in response to individual-level variation in incentives is limited. We link 
administrative socioeconomic microdata with the universe of arrests in Medellín over a decade. 
We exploit exogenous variation in formal-sector employment around a socioeconomic-score 
cutoff, below which individuals receive benefits if not formally employed, to test whether a 
higher cost to formal-sector employment induces crime. Regression discontinuity estimates show 
this policy generated reductions in formal-sector employment and a corresponding spike in 
organized crime, but no effects on crimes of impulse or opportunity.
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1 Introduction
Many countries, particularly across the developing world and in much of Latin America, are
plagued by coincident high degrees of informality in the labor market and criminal activity,
often controlled by organized enterprises (Arteaga, 2019; Blattman et al., 2017; Buonanno
and Vargas, 2018; Chimeli and Soares, 2017; Dell et al., 2018; DiTella et al., 2010; DiTella
and Schargrodsky, 2013; Dix-Carneiro et al., 2018; Sviatschi, 2018). However, the empirical
evidence on whether the two phenomena are causally linked by way of occupational sorting
decisions of individuals is limited. Classic models of criminal behavior contend that individuals
rationally weigh the expected costs and benefits of engaging in criminal activity (Becker, 1968;
Ehrlich, 1973). Here, economic incentives play an important role via alternatives to crime:
primarily legitimate employment in the labor market. Recent studies have confirmed that crime
deterrence can be effective in reducing criminal activity (DiTella and Schargrodsky, 2013, 2014).
However, understanding the economic decision to engage in crime is important, as reducing
crime through incapacitation can be less effective when the elasticity of individual supply to
crime is high (Freeman, 1999).
We use rich administrative data between 2002 and 2013 from Medell´ın, Colombia to test the
relationship between formal employment and participation in crime at the individual level. In
this empirical context, where informal employment is common and criminal enterprise activity
abounds, financially dissuading individuals from engaging in formal employment could drive
some to organized crime as their most lucrative option in the informal sector. Exploiting a
discontinuity in the cost of formal work in Colombia, we leverage individual-level variation to
empirically illustrate the occupational choice between formal employment and participation in
criminal enterprise.
The Colombian government provides health benefits to all residents that reside within a
household that has a socio-economic score (known as the Sisben score) below a certain threshold.
Those formally employed are automatically taxed a fraction of their wages to avail of comparable
benefits. Formal employment of any member affects the family’s eligibility for this program,
raising the relative benefits to other forms of employment.1 That is, the usual benefits to formal
1Eligibility is determined at the family level, with the employment status and incomes of children under the
2
employment (e.g., higher wages, job security, legal protections) are at least partially offset by
the increased cost of health care coverage for those below the cutoff who would be eligible for
full coverage by the government if they were not formally employed. Near complete health care
coverage in the population, despite costs representing large proportions of income for many
households, reveals the importance of these incentives in this context.
Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that the policy induced a roughly 4 percent-
age point lower formal employment rate at the margin, consistent with estimates from previous
studies.2 These same individuals are more likely to be arrested for crimes associated with or-
ganized criminal activity. At the RD cutoff we find a 0.45 percentage point rise in gang-related
violent crimes, a roughly 0.66 percentage point rise in gang-related property crimes, and a less
precisely estimated 0.1 percentage point rise in gang-related drug crimes.3
Importantly, offenses less likely to be associated with economically motivated organizations,
like rape and marijuana consumption, do not show significant increases at the cutoff, allowing
us to rule out many alternative theories.4 At the margin, the program raised the cost of being
employed in the formal sector. High-crime environments like Medell´ın have an informal market
that contains many lucrative “employment” opportunities with organized criminal enterprises
(i.e., gangs). In fact, related studies have argued that profit-making criminal activity is fully
controlled by these organized entities such that most, if not all, economically motivated criminal
activity occurs under their oversight (Blattman et al., 2018). Indeed, additional results show
that impacts on gang-related criminal arrests are strongest in neighborhoods known to have the
highest gang opportunities at baseline. Our results suggest that increases in formal employment
can lead to reductions in criminal activities linked to these organized entities. Our magnitudes
are similar to the related literature, as we measure an economically meaningful 3.1% increase
age of 25 living at home also determining eligibility. Accordingly, parents may have reason to discourage their
children from joining the formal sector to avoid losing access to benefits. At the beginning of our sample period,
the subsidized program covered nearly 60% of health services that the full program covered – this fraction
increased consistently to eventually cover 100% of services.
2When evaluating the effect on the entire country using a different research design, Camacho et al. (2014)
find that the program led to a 4 percentage point decrease in formal employment, consistent with the point
estimate we obtain. Despite the reduction in formal employment, reported incomes are not significantly different
at the cutoff suggesting a replacement with informal sources of economic activity.
3Additional results in which joint outcomes of non-formal employment and criminal arrests are studied
confirm that those leaving formal work and those arrested are the same. The results for gang-related drug
crimes are significant when we simultaneously measure both non-formal employment and arrests as an outcome.
4For instance, if social benefits induce risky behavior it should increase non-gang crimes as well.
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in arrests for every 1 percentage point fall in formal employment.5
Even though models of criminal activity are based on individual behavior, we often test
these models using aggregate area-based relationships like unemployment shocks (Agan and
Makowsky, 2018; Bennett and Ouazad, 2018; Cornwell and Trumbull, 1994; Entorf, 2000; Foley,
2011; Fougere et al., 2009; Gould et al., 2002; Karin, 2005; Lin, 2008; Machin and Meghir,
2004; Raphael and Winter-Ember, 2001). Area-based relationships are meaningful and policy
relevant as they inform how to broadly target crime deterrence strategies. Yet, variation at
the individual level is likely to produce different estimates than those that rely on aggregate
shocks.6 In our work, we are interested in the individual-level decision to engage in criminal
activity as it allows us to understand (and potentially address) some root causes of why youth
choose a life of crime.
Some of the literature’s best evidence of individual-level economic decisions related to crime
comes from experiments that raise the human capital of individuals (Berk et al., 1980; Blattman
and Annan, 2015; Bloom, 2006; Heller, 2014; Kemple et al., 1993; Schochet et al., 2008). We
complement this evidence on how changes to human capital affect the returns to both standard
employment and criminal activity, by examining the occupational choice between legitimate
and illegitimate activity as relative incentives are changed. Many studies that attempt to
examine individual-level occupational choices between legitimate and criminal activities rely
on associations conditional on extremely rich sets of observables (Freeman, 1999; Grogger,
1998; Gronqvist, 2017; Lochner, 2004), as plausibly exogenous variation is challenging to find.7
5In their review of the recent literature, Bennett and Ouazad (2018) show that prior studies usually find that
1 percentage point increase in unemployment rates are associated with a 3-7% increase in crime. In Section 8
we discuss why our elasticities may be on the lower side of estimates in prior work.
6For example, unemployment at the regional level reduces the returns to criminal activity (i.e., lowers the
resources available to expropriate and is correlated with fewer potential victims in the area (Mustard, 2010)).
General equilibrium effects in which a new stock of criminals may crowd-out others, and neighborhood and peer
effects both within and across neighborhoods might affect the relationship between area-based employment and
choices to engage in crime (Cullen et al., 2006; Dustmann and Damm, 2014; Ihlanfeldt, 2007; Kling et al.,
2005, 2007). Fella and Gallipoli (2014) find that general equilibrium effects explain a substantial portion of the
relationship between crime and schooling. Additionally, detection rates of crime outcomes may defer as local
resources change. Lastly, economic activity and high-income individuals may leave areas with high or increasing
crime (Cullen et al., 2005; Cullen and Levitt, 1999; Greenbaum and Tita, 2004), further affecting the association
between crime and employment observed at the aggregate level.
7It may be difficult to account for unobservables that would determine both employment and crime. For
example, factors like high discount rates determine both crime and job-search (DellaVigna and Paserman,
2005; Golsteyn et al., 2014), whereas childhood shocks and decisions may affect both adult employment and
crime (Doyle, 2008, 2007; Lochner and Moretti, 2004; Sviatschi, 2018). Reverse causality leads to upward bias
as employers are less likely to prefer individuals that may display attributes correlated to criminal behavior
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Lastly, many studies depend on self-reported crime that may under-measure the occurrence of
criminal activity, or homicides and victim-based data which capture the likelihood of being a
victim rather than a criminal (Freeman, 1999).
We overcome each of these issues raised by previous researchers in examining the relationship
between formal employment and criminal activity in Medell´ın, Colombia. First, we link two
sources of administrative data at the individual level: the universe of arrests and the pre-
arrest socio-economic characteristics of citizens, overcoming measurement issues in self-reported
criminal activity and aggregate area-based measures of crime. Administrative individual-level
data allow us to leverage individual-level variation and focus on demographics more likely
to be affected. Next, we exploit quasi-experimental variation in the relative cost of formal-
sector employment (or relative benefits to informal employment) derived from a social benefits
program that requires individuals to be outside the formal sector to be eligible. Rather than
associations conditional on observables, we use exogenous variation in financial incentives to
isolate the individual-level relationship between employment and crime. Last, our data allow us
to distinguish between different types of crime and conduct falsification tests by comparing the
impacts on crimes most likely associated with economically motivated criminal organizations
to the impacts on other, more idiosyncratic crimes of impulse and opportunity.
Our contributions lie in validating economic models of occupational choice and criminal
behavior (Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973), leveraging individual -level variation in employment in-
centives and rich individual-level administrative data to establish a causal relationship between
formal employment and crime. Such evidence has proven difficult to find in a literature that has
mostly relied on aggregate shocks. Recent studies have highlighted how unemployment shocks,
job loss and employment restrictions have lead to increases in criminal activity (Bennett and
Ouazad, 2018; Pinotti, 2017; Rose, 2019). Our paper complements this small set of recent
studies by testing occupational choice as a result of exogenous variation in exposure to a tax to
formal wages.8 In addition, we stress the importance of distinguishing between different types
(Grogger, 1995; Kling, 2006; Lott, 1992). Unemployment rates can affect the number of victims even if there
are no new criminals: employed persons may have resources that are targeted, or the unemployed may be in
the crossfire or suffer substance abuse.
8We think our estimated elasticities could differ substantially as job losses and structurally imposed employ-
ment restrictions may additionally induce effects on depression, subsequent job search, social stigma etc.
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of crime, as some are more likely to be associated with organized criminal enterprises (e.g.,
homicide) whereas others are more likely to be crimes of impulse, addiction or opportunity
(e.g., rape and drug consumption). In doing so, we establish a falsification test to rule out
alternative mechanisms that have little to do with occupational choice.
Finally, there are few studies in the developing world, as many look at the US, the UK
or Scandinavian countries from which data are more readily available (Bhuller et al., 2018;
Dustmann and Damm, 2014; Freeman, 1999). In contrast, we study a high-crime environment
similar to most parts of the developing world and, in particular, a city with a significant presence
of organized crime, which has been shown to have particularly detrimental effects on growth
and development (Alesina et al., 2017; Melnikov et al., 2019), and broader consequences for
child development (Arteaga, 2019).9 We build upon recent evidence from important high-crime
environments in Latin America that leverages area-based variation from trade-shocks (Dell
et al., 2018; Dix-Carneiro et al., 2018), or district-level unemployment (Buonanno and Vargas,
2018; Cortes et al., 2016).10 Finally, we highlight an unintended, adverse consequence of welfare
policy, contributing to previous work on the interaction between public sector interventions and
crime (Chimeli and Soares, 2017; Chioda et al., 2016; Doyle, 2008; Yang, 2008).11
2 Background
2.1 Crime in Medell´ın
Located in the north-western region of Colombia, Medell´ın is the second largest city after the
capital, Bogota. It has strong industrial and financial sectors with approximately 2.3 million
people or 5.5% of the Colombian population. The urban zone consists of 249 neighborhoods,
divided into 21 (comunas), 5 of which are semi-rural townships (corregimientos).
9More than one in five young men in our sample were arrested. Our high crime context is similar to many
parts of the developing world, including other parts of Latin America. In the developed world, the US has high
incarceration rates (Kearney et al., 2014) but relatively lower crime rates.
10This literature also shows that local trade shocks also affect public goods provisioning, inequality and
policing, suggesting that the general equilibrium effects may be substantial (Dix-Carneiro et al., 2018; Feler and
Senses, 2017). Indeed, Dix-Carneiro et al. (2018) extensively discuss the various channels through which such
aggregate shocks may affect crime.
11Related work studies how elected officials may engage in criminal activity (Ferraz and Finan, 2008, 2011;
Olken and Pande, 2012), and how multiple prices for public programs lead to distortions (Barnwal, 2018).
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Although Colombian violence has traditionally been high, the emergence of drug cartels
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, fueled the emergence of organized crime to support ille-
gal businesses, and guerrilla or paramilitary groups to care for the entire production chain.
From the mid 1980s to early 1990s, homicide rates rose rapidly driven by the boom of cartels,
paramilitaries, and local gangs. Medell´ın used to be one of the most violent cities in the world
(CCSPJP, 2009), placing our analysis among a handful that study motivations behind joining
organized crime in high-crime environments. The high homicide rates are a result of fights
among urban militias, local gangs, drug cartels, criminal bands, and paramilitaries based in
surrounding areas.12 Many demobilized militias continue to be involved in crimes like extortion
and trafficking, given their experience with using guns and avoiding police (Rozema, 2018).
There are two features of the homicide rate that are pertinent for our analysis. First, it is
predominantly male. In 2002, the first year of our data, the male homicide rate was 184 per
100,000 whereas the female homicide rate was about 12, less than one-tenth the rate of males.
Over the entire sample period (2005-13), 12% of all males (across all age groups) were at some
point arrested, while the arrest rate for females was only 1%. Second, youth, between 13 and
26 years, are far more likely to be involved as victims or assailants than other age groups.
Approximately, 63% of first arrests are between 13 and 26. Younger individuals are more
likely to be engaged in drug trafficking and consumption, whereas slightly older individuals
are involved in violent crimes (homicides, extortions, and kidnapping), and the oldest still are
involved in property crime. Irrespective of type of crime, however, arrest rates peak within the
13 to 26 age window depicted in Figure A2.
In ongoing research, Blattman et al. (2018) document Medell´ın’s criminal world as hundreds
of well-defined street gangs (combos) which control local territories and are organized into hier-
archical relationships of supply, and protection by the razones at the top of the hierarchy. They
confirm that gangs are mainly profit-seeking organizations, earning money from protection, co-
ercive services such as debt collection and drug sales. Anthropological studies and in person
interviews show that economic incentives (such as the focus of our study) drive young men in
Medell´ın to join organized crime (Baird, 2011). As many respondents highlight, the reason to
12Operacion Orion, followed by the demobilization of paramilitary forces led to a sharp decline in homicides,
as the military clamped down on urban militias (Medina and Tamayo, 2011).
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join crime is mostly “economic” or for a profitable career.13 Knowing this, paramilitaries and
gangs actively recruit idle youth that are amurrao (local slang, literally: ‘sitting on the wall’)
and without a formal sector job.
An interview with El Mono (p191 ) documents the recruitment process: “those guys would
hang out around here and be nice to me and say ‘come over here, have a bit of money’.” Having
a formal sector job means that one is not “hanging around the neighborhood” when the gangs
come recruiting. A desirable outside option would be a job with benefits and social security,
yet those with formal sector jobs pay extortion fees to gangs.14 Indeed, the options are often
presented as an occupational choice: “are you gonna work [for the gang] or do a normal job?”15
Often, however, remunerations for gang-members are higher than jobs for those with similar
levels of education (Doyle, 2016). New recruits are employed to run guns (carritos), before
transitioning to extortion and trafficking. Blattman et al. (2018) estimate that foot soldiers of
the combos receive well above national minimum wage whereas combo leaders earnings “put
them in the top 10% of income earners in the city.” These anecdotes are consistent with our
hypothesis: higher costs of formal sector jobs (or better benefits for informal work) discourage
youth from joining the formal sector, which in turn leads them to be recruited by gangs.16
For our sample of young men in the bandwidth of analysis, 21.5% were arrested over the
period of study – 11.1% for drug crimes, 5.6% for property crime, and 4.8% for violent crimes.
These numbers are high relative to most contexts, but are representative of cities in Latin
America. The US has an incarceration rate more than six times the typical OECD nation,
where one in ten youths from a low-income family may join a gang, 60% of crimes are committed
by offenders under the age of 30, and 72% by males (Kearney et al., 2014). Accordingly, in
some regards, arrests in our context are similar to high-crime regions in many parts of the
developing world, and especially Latin America (Dell et al., 2018).
13See interview with Gato, p264 and interview with Armando, p197.
14See interview with El Peludo, p184.
15 See interview with Notes, p193
16During the demobilization of militias in the mid-2000s, many were encouraged to join the formal sector,
given identity cards and medical cards (Rozema, 2018). Yet, this disparity in costs across social benefit regimes,
discourages formal sector re-integration.
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2.2 Access to Health Benefits
In 1993, Law 100 established two tiers of health insurance: the Contributive Regime (CR)
and the Subsidized Regime (SR). The CR covers formal workers with a comprehensive set
of health services that includes nearly all of the most common illnesses. The SR covers the
families of the poorest informal workers and unemployed with a plan that initially covered
fewer illnesses than CR, but was expanded to cover the same benefits.17 Formal workers and
employers fund workers’ insurance premiums for coverage by the CR. Between the 1993 reform
and 1998, insurance coverage under both grew from 20% to 60%. In 2005, SR was expanded
and takeup reached 1.1 million people in Medell´ın, alone. By 2013, 96% of Colombians were
covered, with more than half qualifying under SR (Lamprea and Garcia, 2016).
Colombian employers are required by law to enroll all their employees in a Health Promoting
Company, which gives them access to health insurance under the CR. Self-employed workers
are allowed to enroll in the CR themselves by paying a monthly fixed amount based on a
percentage of the monthly minimum wage. Unemployed or inactive individuals (and informal
workers) can either get health insurance as the self-employed do through the CR, or apply for
access to the SR. Individuals not covered by the CR or the SR use public hospitals, and are
charged fees for both medicines and services.
Formal sector workers make up about 54% of the urban labor force and pay 4% of their
monthly wage for enrollment in the CR, while the employer pays the other 8.5%.18 This implies
that effectively employees may bear a burden somewhere between 4 and 12.5% of their monthly
wage depending on their bargaining power. Formal workers pay 1.5% of their salary to cover
informal workers in SR.19 Over and above this, formal workers have to pay 4% of their wage for
their pensions, and also bear other non-wage labor costs like old-age and disability insurance.
These costs rose by between 10.5% and 11.5% after the 1993 reforms, with strong evidence that
such costs discourage formal sector employment (Kugler and Kugler, 2009).
To target the SR, roughly 70 percent of the poorest households in the country were in-
17In 2008, the Constitutional Court ordered that the basket of health services covered under SR become equal
to that of the CR. However, the reform did not come into effect until July 2012
18Employers’ contribution was 8% between 1993 (Law 100) and 2007. On that date it was increased to 8.5%
(Law 1122). This contribution was eliminated in 2012 (Law 1607) for incomes up to 10 times minimum wages.
19Authorities initially expected the formal sector population to rise and cover costs for SR. But the SR grew
faster than the CR population, in part due to the lucrative nature of the SR (Lamprea and Garcia, 2016).
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terviewed between 1994 and 2003, and a welfare index (Sisben score) was calculated using a
confidential formula based on respondent characteristics, incomes and assets, disability, educa-
tion, and housing. Only households with a Sisben score below a certain cutoff and not formally
employed were eligible to become beneficiaries of the SR.20 Other public programs use the
Sisben score, but the SR Sisben cutoff did not coincide with other major interventions, at the
eligibility cutoff of Sisben in the 2000s.21 The SR health program is by far the largest that has
eligibility determined by the Sisben score.22
2.3 Incentives for Informality
Between 2005 and 2013, informal workers made up about 46% of the urban labor force in
Medellin. Among informal workers, around 60% were own account workers, 20.5% were private
sector employees, 7.8% were domestic workers, 7.7% self-employed workers, and the rest were
laborers, family workers, and unpaid workers. Finally, 31.5% of the workers had primary
education, 51.8% secondary and 16.7% had some college education.
Effectively, financial incentives embodied in the health coverage options switch from po-
tentially promoting formal employment above the cutoff due to a partial defrayal of the costs
of healthcare by the employer, to strongly discouraging formal employment below the cutoff
due to a significantly more enticing full defrayal of these large costs by the government for
individuals who are not formally employed. Near complete health care coverage in the popu-
lation despite costs representing large proportions of income, reveals the importance of these
incentives. That this policy led to a fall in formal-sector employment has been documented in
both the academic literature and public discourse. The Minister of Social Protection, in a news
article in Presidencia de la Republica (February, 2006), claimed that the people’s valuation
of SR was so high that it discouraged formal employment. Studying the effects on the entire
country, Camacho et al. (2014) use individual-level data and control for both region and time
fixed effects to show that informal employment increased by 4 percentage points as SR was
20Households keep their Sisben score until it is updated by the government (expected to take place about
every five years). In this case, the government updates the Sisben survey and score for the entire country.
21See www.sisben.gov.co/Paginas/Noticias/Puntos-de-corte.aspx for programs by Sisben 3 cutoff. While the
Sisben cutoff for SR enrollment may differ across counties, there is only one cutoff for the entirety of Medell´ın,.
22The share of the SR in the total budget accounts to nearly 2% of the GDP, while all other programs sought
to reduce poverty represent less than 0.4% of GDP.
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rolled out across the country. This is a combination of workers dropping out of the formal
sector, but also fewer youth joining the formal sector over time (Lamprea and Garcia, 2016).
Recognizing these adverse effects on formal employment, the government drastically lowered
the costs of being enrolled in CR right at the end of our study period, when Law 1607 was
enacted. This led to a significant increase in formal sector employment (Bernal et al., 2017;
Ferna´ndez and Villar, 2017; Kugler et al., 2017; Morales and Medina, 2017).
Since the Sisben score and targeting is at the family level rather than individual level, older
family members may discourage youth within the family from joining the formal labor force for
fear of losing access to benefits.23 Large families stay informal in the hope of retaining benefits
(Joumard and Londono, 2013).24 Indeed, Santamaria et al. (2008) find that half of all SR
recipients indicated that they would not switch to formal employment as it would mean losing
benefits. These effects are not restricted to men, as women’s formal-sector participation also
decreased in response to SR (Gaviria et al., 2007). Yet, we find that dis-employment effects on
men are about four times larger than on women, consistent with the hypothesis that men have
a lucrative alternative outside the formal sector: organized crime.
We leverage the fact that the costs of accessing these benefits change discontinuously at the
Sisben cutoff. Indeed, as most individuals are covered by one healthcare regime or the other,25
almost everyone has similar access to benefits on either side of the cutoff. Yet, on one side of
the cutoff these benefits are free only if you are not formally employed. The primary driving
variation, therefore, is that being outside the formal sector allows you to not pay for benefits
on one side of the cutoff. Since by the end of the period almost everyone has healthcare (under
either one of the two regimes) and the benefits are similar across the two regimes, there are no
discontinuous changes to health benefits at the cutoff.
23By Article 21, Decree 2353 of 205, the Sisben score is determined at the family level.
24Similarly interviews in Baird (2011) highlight how being involved in crime can sometimes be a ‘family
decision’ (chapter 6).
25By 2013 the coverage is 96% (Lamprea and Garcia, 2016).
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3 Data
Administrative data allow us to identify the relationship between the costs of formal employ-
ment and crime. We do not need to rely on self-reported or aggregate victim counts. As our
data is at the individual-level we isolate vulnerable demographics (young men), and test both
employment outcomes and crime. Additionally, detailed information on the types of crime
allow us to isolate mechanisms.
We combine two sources of data at the individual level using national identification numbers
and dates of birth. One source is from successive Sisben surveys of the Medell´ın population
for three different years: 2002 (baseline Sisben I ), 2005 (Sisben II ) and 2009-2010 (Sisben
III ). The Sisben dataset consists of cross sections from censuses of the poor, and we match
household records across the three waves.26 The second source is the census of individuals
arrested between 2002-13 for each crime, whether or not they were convicted, from the Judicial
Police Sectional of the National Police Department.
Our measure of criminal activity is arrests, rather than self-reported crime, and we acknowl-
edge that either measure has its tradeoffs. We follow the literature and restrict our analysis to
data on first arrests. Repeat arrests are excluded as time spent under incarceration and the
length of sentencing may be endogenous to other characteristics.27 Indeed, first arrests most
closely map to the first decision node between legal and illegal activities. Once captured a
criminal career begins, with subsequent decisions to repeat, escalate, or exit the criminal sector
based on many factors we do not observe (including prison sentences). Accordingly, subsequent
criminal behavior is outside the scope of this study.
For similar reasons, we follow recent studies (Gronqvist, 2017; Kling et al., 2005) in focusing
on young men in our analysis. Our primary sample is between 21 and 26 years old in the last year
of our arrest data, or between 13 and 26 for the entire period (2005-2013) of study, capturing
more than 63% of first arrests (as shown in Figure A2). Of the individuals arrested more than
once during the observation period, 40% are first arrested before the age of 27. At the same
26Municipalities survey a census of people living in the three poorest socioeconomic strata. In low income
municipalities, the survey is a census of the whole population, while in larger cities it amounts to 65-80% of the
population.
27Our results are robust to including repeat arrests.
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time, while incarcerated, individuals would not be able to be arrested for additional crimes
and would, therefore, have lower measured propensities to be engaged in new criminal activity.
Older individuals may have been arrested in their youth (or currently still be incarcerated) but
as our crime data only begins in the early 2000s, we do not have their entire criminal history,
and would miss their youth arrest. As such, we exclude older men. Focusing on ages when
arrest rates peak reduces these concerns regarding the measurement of criminality, and allows
us to emphasize the period when young men first make choices between crime and other jobs
in Medell´ın (Doyle, 2016).
Figure A1 describes the timeline of our data. We use the 2002 Sisben as our baseline to
create our running variable and predict eligibility for SR.28 We test for SR enrollment in the
2005 Sisben, and for employment status and incomes in the 2009 Sisben. We then follow the
criminal histories of young men aged 21 to 26 in 2013, between 2005 (after we have a measure
of SR enrollment from the second Sisben) and 2013. Even though we do not have a panel of
formal sector work that follows the census of poor individuals in every year (along with their
identification numbers), we do believe that this database, to the best of our knowledge, is one
of the most comprehensive data exercises in such contexts.
In Appendix Table 1 presents the 2002 baseline summary statistics of the complete Sisben
survey and for the subsample of males only.29 The arrests data include a detailed description of
the person arrested (national identification number and date of birth), the type of crime (e.g.,
homicide, rape, motor vehicle theft, etc.), the precise article associated with the crime in the
penal code, the date of arrest, the location of arrest, and a police generated flag for whether the
arresting officer knew the perpetrator to be gang affiliated. We classify the crimes into three
categories – violent, property, and drug crimes – based on the US Bureau of Justice Statistics’
classifications in the Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics (BJS, 1994). If an individual
was first arrested for violent crime and later for property crime, they show up once as an arrest
for violent crime.
28The formula to compute the Sisben score and the eligibility cutoff varies across the waves (I, II, and III).
29The SR status is established based on the previously computed Sisben score, based on the semi-decadal
Sisben municipality census of the 70% of the poorest population. After a Sisben survey, it takes around one
or two years to get the new Sisben score and whether the household becomes eligible. This is why the correct
running variable to use is the lagged Sisben score.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics in 2002
Complete Sample Males
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Individual Characteristics
Male 0.490 0.500 1.000 0.000
Subsidized Regime 0.319 0.466 0.312 0.463
Contributive Regime 0.228 0.420 0.222 0.416
Age 10-15 0.105 0.306 0.109 0.311
Age 15-20 0.105 0.306 0.110 0.313
Age 20-25 0.089 0.285 0.093 0.290
Age 25-30 0.068 0.251 0.068 0.251
Ever Arrested 0.062 0.242 0.114 0.318
Household Head (HH) Characteristics
Female 0.387 0.487 0.308 0.462
Employed 0.628 0.483 0.643 0.479
Unemployed 0.106 0.308 0.107 0.309
Married 0.345 0.475 0.377 0.485
Attending School 0.009 0.097 0.008 0.089
Has CR 0.207 0.405 0.207 0.405
Age 43.237 14.302 43.869 14.159
Years of Education 4.542 2.451 4.480 2.454
Owns House 0.314 0.464 0.327 0.469
Sisben Stratum 1 0.271 0.444 0.273 0.446
Sisben Stratrum 2 0.620 0.485 0.620 0.485
Sisben score 45.707 9.901 45.716 9.908
Number of members in household 4.090 1.709 4.215 1.709
N 1,161,446 568,923
Summary tabulations using Sisben I survey, conducted in the year 2002, and police arrests data.
Next, we divide crimes into crimes that would be more associated with an occupational
choice. In Medell´ın, this implies being associated with a gang. The advantage of this additional
classification is that we can test whether the decision to engage in crime is merely about
income generation (e.g., engaging in petty theft property crime) or an occupational choice (gang
crimes). While both are related, and consistent with the broader Becker (1968) hypothesis, we
find that gang-crime arrests increase, even as non-gang income generating property crimes do
not (and neither do non gang violent crimes of impulse or passion).
We worked closely with senior police officials in Medell´ın to divide our crimes into gang-
related and non gang-related crimes. Police officials inform us that the best way to classify
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arrests as gang related are along two dimensions: (1) the crime, and (2) the location. Fortu-
nately, for about 30% of our data, the police used a system that flagged the arrest with whether
the individual was known gang affiliate or not, and information on which gang the individual
belonged to. This gang affiliation was based on police intelligence. As the gang-flag system was
not available for the entirety of the period, we classify a crime as ‘gang-related’ if more than
30% of recorded arrests had the gang flag.30 As a result, for example, we classify homicides as
violent gang-related, and rape or domestic violence as violent non gang-related.31
In robustness checks, we use a method that relies on the association between these crimes
and historically high-gang neighborhoods. In this alternative definition, we classify those crimes
as gang-related if they are disproportionately more likely (above the median) to list any of these
high-gang neighborhoods as a location of arrest. While these two methods are not perfect, the
robustness to alternative definitions gives us solace, and to the best of our knowledge, such a
data exercise has not been conducted in such a comprehensive manner before.32
In Appendix Table A1, we categorize the 25 (of 103) most prevalent crimes under each
classification method. These data-driven methods line up with our priors on types of crime:
homicides, motor vehicle theft, extortion, kidnapping, break-ins, and the manufacturing, de-
livery and trafficking of drugs fall under organized crimes. The remaining crimes are often
thought of as crimes of impulse or opportunity (like rape, simple assault, and drug consump-
tion). Indeed, we can distinguish between minute details – such as trafficking cocaine (gang)
vs consuming drugs (non gang). The advantage of these classification approaches is that they
are purely data driven. Additionally, they may speak to the types of activities that gangs in
Medell´ın engage in: for example, they are more likely to engage in car theft than identity theft.
30Our results are robust to using the median as the cutoff.
31Gang-rape gets classified as a gang crime. Our police contacts also describe how burglars are imbibed into
gangs based on their work territories and would find it difficult to be a burglar without being a part of the gang.
32Additionally, using the crime-level classification (rather than the individual flags) of gang-related crimes
protects us against any police biases against specific individuals, or their characteristics (such as insurance
status or who the police have more intelligence on).
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4 Enrollment in the Subsidized Regime (SR)
As only households in the two lowest levels of Sisben I (2002), a score below 47, could qualify
for the SR, we compare households on either side of the cutoff to identify the effect of SR
eligibility. First, we verify if there is a discontinuity in the probability of SR enrollment at the
cutoff. Second, we examine how the likelihood of being in the formal sector changes at the
cutoff. Last, we examine the effect on different types of criminal activity.
In following RD conventions, we normalize the Sisben score so that treated units are individ-
uals with positive values of our new score. Figure 1 presents the first stage: the discontinuity
in the probability of SR enrollment using the optimal binning procedure found in Calonico
et al. (2014a). The probability of enrollment discontinuously increases by around 26 percent-
age points.33 Not all eligible persons enroll in SR, as formal sector jobs may be valuable to
some, but enrollment still jumps substantially to 42% at the cutoff.
Figure 1: Discontinuity in the Probability of SR enrollment at Cutoff.
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SR enrollment is probability of being enrolled in the subsidized regime in 2005. RD Graph using optimal
binning procedure discussed in Calonico et al. (2014a). Normalized Sisben (2002) score on horizontal axis
centered around cutoff. Higher values represent low scores (higher poverty).
For two-staged least squares (2SLS) exercises we follow a fuzzy regression discontinuity
design, where our running variable is the 2002 Sisben score. We use both parametric and non-
33Around 20% of households that have a high 2002 Sisben also avail of SR in 2005, as a fraction of households
became eligible under a smaller 1998 Sisben survey, and the government allows them to keep their benefits for
some time after they graduate out of eligibility.
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parametric approaches to estimate the effect of SR eligibility at the cutoff. For the parametric
approach we follow Hahn et al. (2001), where we instrument enrollment in the SR with the
eligibility indicator 1 [si < 47], and estimate the following equation as our first stage:
SRi,n = α + α11 [si,n < 47] +X
′
i,nα2 + Ai (si,n)α3 + µn + εi,n , (1)
where Ai is a vector of smooth polynomial functions of the Sisben score of each individual, si,n.
In robustness checks, we also estimate models conditioning on demographics and other baseline
characteristics. Here Xi,n is a vector of demographic characteristics for individual i living in
neighborhood n. µn corresponds to neighborhood fixed effects for the 249 neighborhoods.
34
An important issue in practice is the selection of the smoothing parameter. We use local
regressions to estimate the discontinuity in outcomes at the cutoff point. In particular, we
estimate local polynomial regressions conducted with a rectangular kernel and employing the
optimal data-driven procedure suggested by Calonico et al. (2014b). We use two different op-
timal bandwidth procedures: the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) method and the Calonico
et al. (2014b) bandwidth. The optimal bandwidths from the different procedures lie between
5.5 and 6.2 points, on the 100-point Sisben I scale. We present our results for multiple band-
widths to highlight the robust nature of our estimates, varying them from below the optimal
bandwidths to larger bandwidths. Specifically, we check for coefficient stability for results span-
ning these bandwidths ranging between 4 and 10 points around the cutoff. Varying the size of
the bandwidth and the polynomial order do not affect the results.
Our first stage results are shown in Table 2, displaying the 26 percentage point increase in
SR enrollment shown in Figure 1. As we vary the bandwidths from 4 through 10 the coefficient
is stable and both economically and statistically significant. The table also shows that the
standard IV F-test suggests a strong instrument, and for our remaining outcomes we conduct
two-staged least squares analyses using this is as our first stage.
34We include controls in robustness checks, where we control for various characteristics of the household
head in 2002, the baseline year. These controls include an indicator for female-headed households, employment
status, years of education, marital status, attendance to any academic institute, year-of-birth fixed effects,
socioeconomic strata of the household, and home ownership.
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Table 2: SR Enrollment at Sisben Cutoff (First Stage)
Variables Bandwidths: 4 6 10
Dependent Variable: Enrolled in SR (First Stage)
Below Sisben Cutoff 0.260*** 0.260*** 0.269***
(0.0138) (0.0132) (0.0110)
F-stat of IV 354.97 387.97 598.02
Number of observations 181,132 246,974 340,581
Sample mean (in bandwidth) 0.36
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. Coefficient of indicator of
being below Sisben cutoff, with linear controls for 2002 Sisben scores that vary flexibly at the cutoff. SR enrollment as measured
in the 2005 Sisben survey. Standard errors clustered at the comuna level.
5 Impacts on Formal Employment and Reported Income
We test the simple hypothesis that the SR conditions disincentivized formal-sector employment
and led to an increase in organized-crime activities. We first reproduce a well-established result
and show that the program has a negative effect on formal employment (Camacho et al., 2014;
Gaviria et al., 2007; Joumard and Londono, 2013; Santamaria et al., 2008). We exploit the
discontinuity in enrollment rates at the cutoff, by using the eligibility indicator as an instrument
for enrollment status to identify the effect of SR on formal employment and income. Here
Empi,n is 1 if the individual i from neighborhood n was formally employed. In robustness
checks we include demographic controls in Xi,n, and neighborhood fixed effects µn. We show
the reduced form relationship between employment and being above the RD cutoff:
Empi,n = γ0 + γ11 [si,n < 47] +X
′
i,nγ2 + Ai (si,n) γ3 + µn + εi,n ,
We then instrument for SR enrollment, where ˆSRi,n is the predicted SR enrollment proba-
bility from the first stage estimated in Equation 1. The second stage is:
Empi,n = β0 + β1 ˆSRi,n +X
′
i,nβ2 + Ai (si,n) β3 + µn + i,n ,
Figure 2 captures the fall in formal sector employment at the cutoff, where formal employ-
ment is defined as a working individual making wage contributions to benefits as measured in
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Figure 2: Discontinuity in Formal Employment (2009).
RD Graph using optimal binning procedure discussed in Calonico et al. (2014a). Formal employment based on measures in 2009
Sisben survey. Subsample of males. Normalized Sisben (2002) score on horizontal axis centered around cutoff. Higher values
represent low scores (higher poverty).
the 2009 Sisben III survey.35 In our RD figures, we focus on a bandwidth of 6 around the cutoff
as it is the Calonico et al. (2014b) optimal bandwidth.
Table 3 presents the results for reported formal employment and incomes in the 2009 Sisben
survey. The table presents results for the reduced form change at the cutoff, and the two-staged
least squares (2SLS) effect of enrolling in SR. These results show that the health insurance
program had a negative impact of 4.1 percentage points (when using the optimal bandwidth)
on the probability of being employed in the formal sector in 2009.
Lower formal sector employment at the cutoff may be a combination of fewer youth joining
the formal sector as they enter working-age, lower transition rates out of informal work, and
higher transition probabilities out of formal work at the cutoff. As formal sector employment
affects SR enrollment for the entire family, these are often family decisions, where older family
members may discourage youth from joining the formal sector (Joumard and Londono, 2013).
This effect is larger for men than it is for women (Appendix Table A2), perhaps once again
35While this is a somewhat conservative measure of formal employment, Colombian employees who pay
contributions to health insurance have been widely considered by the literature to be formal employees (See
Attanasio et al., 2017; Morales and Medina, 2017). The Sisben does not explicitly ask households whether
the worker is in the formal sector, which in any case, the response would be misreported underestimating the
formality rate.
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Table 3: Reported Formal Employment and Income
Bandwidths: 4 6 10
Panel A: Formal Employment in 2009 (Males)
Above Cutoff -0.0147*** -0.0111*** -0.00845***
Reduced Form (0.00467) (0.00280) (0.00217)
Enrolled in SR -0.0539*** -0.0411*** -0.0301***
2SLS (0.0166) (0.0103) (0.00811)
Number of observations 133,067 180,742 247,886
Sample mean (only males in bandwidth for 2009) 0.14
Panel B: Annual Household Income in 2009 (USD)
Above Cutoff -3.837 -3.805 2.347
Reduced Form (3.100) (2.295) (4.008)
Enrolled in SR -6.481 -3.042 30.49
2SLS (9.163) (8.842) (27.83)
Number of observations 46,797 63,457 87,510
Sample mean (households in bandwidth for 2009) 171.24
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. We use the Sisben survey of
2009 to construct both outcome variables. Formal employment for males only. The results for women are presented in Table A2.
Tables report Two-Staged Least Squares (2SLS) coefficients where the first stage is SR enrollment on being below the Sisben cutoff.
Regressions control linearly for the Sisben score, flexibly around the cutoff. We cluster standard errors by comuna. Household-level
income reported in pesos and converted to USD using the average 2009 exchange rate. Sample means for males and households
only in bandwidth for 2009.
highlighting that males have an outside option in organized crime.36
The impact on household-level income is statistically indistinguishable from zero and eco-
nomically small ($30 per household annually). One caveat is that income is self-reported, and
respondents may under-report assets and incomes in order to get a lower Sisben score. However,
as respondents do not know the score formula, perfect manipulation is impossible (whether or
not they are part of a gang), and therefore, as we show below, the density of respondents is
smooth around the cutoff.
We may especially expect that incomes from illicit activities are under-reported rather than
36Note, that we should not necessarily think of this result as a ‘first-stage’ on crime outcomes. Instead, crime
and formal employment choices are jointly determined. Indeed, it is possible that, as we predict, the incentives
lead individuals to leave the formal sector and join crime. After a few years in crime, an individual may wish
to re-join the formal sector, but may be unable to do so given a criminal record.
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over-reported, perhaps suggesting that poverty-based desperation is less likely to be driving
criminal activity. We should be wary of reading too much into these self-reported income
measures, but if anything they suggest that even as workers drop out of the formal sector
they find other sources of income. Indeed, by revealed preference, they choose to drop out of
the formal sector, and as such, should be better off. Yet, we wish to be extremely careful in
stressing the crudeness of self-reported income measures.
Canonical crime models (Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973) stress the role of both income and
substitution effects when wages in one sector change. In analyses that focus on legitimate
sector job-loss and unemployment shocks, the income and substitution effects may work to
both increase criminal activity. Interestingly, in contrast, here any gains from the subsidy
essentially lower the likelihood of criminal activity.
Together, the results of this section show that higher costs of formal employment discouraged
youth from joining the formal sector. As health care coverage via either regime is almost
universal, individuals on either side have similar benefits, but on one side are more likely to
choose to be outside of the formal sector to avoid high costs of maintaining this coverage. The
obvious question that this then raises is how this aversion to formal sector employment affects
the likelihood of criminal activity.
6 Impacts on Crime
We next turn our attention to outcomes on crime. One important distinction with the formal
employment results is that we only measure formal employment in one year, whereas we measure
crime cumulatively pooled over a decade. We interpret the impacts on crime as causally related
to the incentives to leave the formal sector.37 We show both the reduced form and two-staged
least squares estimates of impacts on crime. In the second stage, we use the eligibility indicator
as an instrument for enrollment status to identify the effect of SR enrollment on crime. Here
crimei is 1 if the individual i was arrested between 2005 and 2013.
38
37Note that by the latter half of this period almost everyone had healthcare (under either one of the two
regimes), and the benefits were similar. As such health benefits are not changing at the cutoff, only the
incentives behind who pays for it changes.
38Even as we have crime data for many years, we have formal employment only recorded at one point of time
in 2009. This poses challenges when trying to simultaneously measure changes in employment and crime. Yet
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Crimei,n = β0 + β1 ˆSRi,n +X
′
i,nβ2 + Ai (si,n) β3 + µn + εi,n ,
Our main results do not condition on other factors. In robustness checks, we control for
various characteristics of the household head in 2002, the baseline year. These controls include
an indicator for female-headed households, employment status, years of education, marital
status, attendance to any academic institute, year-of-birth fixed effects, socioeconomic strata of
the household,39 home ownership, and neighborhood fixed effects. A literature on neighborhood
effects and crime (Cullen et al., 2006; Dustmann and Damm, 2014) highlight the perils of
using area-based relationships (like differences in unemployment rates) to study individual-level
occupational choice, and re-iterates the strength of our approach.40 Our results are unaffected
by the inclusion of neighborhood fixed effects that absorb any neighborhood level characteristics
(demographics, amenities, property values and police presence) that may affect crime rates. We
cluster standard errors at the comuna level.
We present results for violent, property, and drug-related crimes, dividing each group be-
tween organized-crime related activities and crimes less likely to be associated with organized
criminal entities. We choose the most conservative specification, where when looking at the
impacts on violent crime, we exclude those whose first arrests were in property or drug crime,
and do the same for each type of crime.41 This is why our number of observations will differ by
type of crime. As such, our outcome will be 1 if the person’s first arrest was in violent crime,
and 0 if they were never arrested in their youth. In robustness checks, we include the other
types of crimes as 0s, and our results are more precisely estimated (see Appendix Table A8).
As discussed in the data section, at the point of arrest, the police record a flag if they
suspect the arrested individual is involved with a gang or not. We calculate the propensity
for being issued this flag for each type of crime, and divide crimes into two groups: high and
low-propensity to be organized criminal activity. This data-driven method to group crimes
our results are robust to doing so (Appendix Table A9).
39Urban areas in Colombia are split into six socioeconomic strata, used by authorities to spatially target
social spending to neighborhoods.
40There may still be general equilibrium effects of the policy that affect the entire country, but since our
variation is not driven by differences across neighborhoods, this is all netted out.
41Not doing so increases the precision of our estimates (Appendix Table A8).
22
produces intuitive classifications (Table A1).
We hypothesize that organized criminal activities are directly related to our implicit model of
occupational choice across legitimate and illegitimate sectors, whereas non-gang-related crimes
should be less affected by the opportunity cost of being in the formal sector and hence serve
as a useful falsification test. We expect the effects on the latter group to be zero, as crimes of
impulse and passion are less directly related to occupational choice.
As we elaborate in a later discussion, over and above a falsification test, the lack of effects
on non-gang crimes also allow us to rule out alternative mechanisms. We do not classify crimes
based on whether or not they are pecuniary as that captures crimes of desperation and necessity
that arise out of poverty. Instead, we posit that the policy induced an occupational choice to
work for a gang, and as such use organized crime as a basis for classification. Alternative
mechanisms (such as riskier behavior when having insurance) may have weight if non-gang
crimes rose as well, but the lack of effects on non-gang crimes allow us to rule them out.
6.1 Violent Crime
We first start with the probability of being arrested for violent criminal activities. Based on
the police flags for gang-related activity, violent organized crimes include homicides, extortion,
and kidnapping. Violent crimes less likely to be associated with an organized entity include
domestic violence, rape and injuries. Figure 3 and Table 4 present the results.
Figure 3 shows the jump in violent gang-related crime arrests at the Sisben cutoff, concen-
trating on an optimal bandwidth of 6 points on the 100 point scale. In Table 4 we present the
regression discontinuity results varying the bandwidth and specifications. The reduced form
results (first row in each panel) show an increase in gang-related violent crime (Panel A), but
no corresponding change in less gang-related violent crime (Panel B). Within a bandwidth of
10 points on the Sisben scale, and measuring arrests over a decade, these results amount to
a 32% increase (or a 0.45 percentage point increase) in violent crime arrests from the mean
around the cutoff. These magnitudes are both economically meaningful and similar to those
from recent studies in other contexts (Pinotti, 2017).
Our 2SLS results (next two rows of each panel) show an economically and statistically
23
Table 4: Violent Crimes
Bandwidths: 4 6 10
Panel A: More Gang-Related Violent Crimes
Above Cutoff 0.00722*** 0.00649** 0.00456**
Reduced Form (0.00236) (0.00249) (0.00164)
Enrolled in SR 0.0257*** 0.0231*** 0.0158***
No Covariates (0.00873) (0.00838) (0.00539)
Enrolled in SR 0.0274*** 0.0232** 0.0149**
Including pre-treatment covariates (0.00950) (0.00937) (0.00583)
Number of observations 18,052 24,272 33,027
Sample mean (men 13-26 years old in bandwidth) 0.014
Sample mean for those enrolled in SR and in high-gang comuna 0.020
Panel B: Less Gang-Related Violent Crimes
Above Cutoff 0.00279 0.000988 -0.000581
Reduced Form (0.00454) (0.00304) (0.00326)
Enrolled in SR 0.00994 0.00349 -0.00201
No Covariates (0.0158) (0.0104) (0.0110)
Enrolled in SR 0.00791 0.00118 -0.00322
Including pre-treatment covariates (0.0168) (0.0111) (0.0125)
Number of observations 18,419 24,768 33,702
Sample mean (men 13-26 years old in bandwidth) 0.034
Sample mean for those enrolled in SR and in high-gang comuna 0.039
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. Tables report reduced form
and two-staged least squares (2SLS) coefficients where the first stage is SR enrollment on being below the Sisben cutoff. The Sisben
score is measured in 2002, and SR enrollment in 2005. We measure crime between 2005 and 2013. Regressions control linearly for
the Sisben score, flexibly around the cutoff. We cluster standard errors by comuna. We consider only males between 21 to 26 years
old in 2013. For regressions that have pre-treatment covariates, we include household characteristics, year of birth fixed effects,
and neighborhood fixed effects. The sample excludes anybody whose first arrest was a property or drug crime (Appendix Table A8
includes these observations as a robustness).
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Figure 3: Gang-Related Violent Crimes
RD Graph using optimal binning procedure discussed in Calonico et al. (2014a). Normalized Sisben (2002) score on horizontal axis
centered around cutoff. Higher values represent low scores (higher poverty).
significant increase in the probability of gang-related violent arrests for individuals enrolled in
SR. We do not find any meaningful effect on the arrest probability for non organized-crime
related violence. A comparison of the various rows in each panel shows that the estimates
are robust to including controls, whereas a comparison across columns shows the robustness
to bandwidths. While we do not report t-tests for the difference between gang and less-gang
related crimes, the coefficients are statistically significantly different for all bandwidths.
6.2 Property Crime
In Figure 4 and Table 5 we analyze the effects on property crimes. Based on police flags, we
establish that gang-related property crimes include crimes like motor vehicle theft and break-ins
to businesses and residences. Crimes like fraud and identify theft are classified as less gang-
related. Once again, in the reduced form we see that gang-related property crimes increase,
with little change to less gang-related property crimes. This estimate, over the entire decade,
constitutes a 21% increase (or a 0.66 percentage point increase) from the mean around the
cutoff within a bandwidth of 10 points.
In the 2SLS results, we also find an economically and statistically significant increase for
gang related property crime arrests, and no strong effect for property crimes less associated
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Table 5: Property Crimes
Bandwidths: 4 6 10
Panel A: More Gang-Related Property Crimes
Above Cutoff 0.0106** 0.00930** 0.00666*
Reduced Form (0.00387) (0.00389) (0.00350)
Enrolled in SR 0.0380*** 0.0331*** 0.0232**
No Covariates (0.0123) (0.0126) (0.0113)
Enrolled in SR 0.0408*** 0.0341*** 0.0240**
Including pre-treatment covariates (0.0139) (0.0131) (0.0108)
Number of observations 18,426 24,740 33,625
Sample mean (men 13-26 years old in bandwidth) 0.032
Sample mean for those enrolled in SR and in high-gang comuna 0.040
Panel B: Less Gang-Related Property Crimes
Above Cutoff -0.00263 -0.00217 -0.00205
Reduced Form (0.00554) (0.00425) (0.00336)
Enrolled in SR -0.00941 -0.00772 -0.00712
No Covariates (0.0194) (0.0149) (0.0112)
Enrolled in SR -0.0116 -0.00872 -0.00854
Including pre-treatment covariates (0.0212) (0.0156) (0.0119)
Number of observations 18,240 24,523 33,358
Sample mean (men 13-26 years old in bandwidth) 0.024
Sample mean for those enrolled in SR and in high-gang comuna 0.028
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. Tables report reduced form
and two-staged least squares (2SLS) coefficients where the first stage is SR enrollment on being below the Sisben cutoff. The Sisben
score is measured in 2002, and SR enrollment in 2005. We measure crime between 2005 and 2013. Regressions control linearly for
the Sisben score, flexibly around the cutoff. We cluster standard errors by comuna. We consider only males between 21 to 26 years
old in 2013. For regressions that have pre-treatment covariates, we include household characteristics, year of birth fixed effects,
and neighborhood fixed effects.The sample excludes anybody whose first arrest was a violent or drug crime (Appendix Table A8
includes these observations as a robustness).
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Figure 4: Gang-Related Property Crimes
RD Graph using optimal binning procedure discussed in Calonico et al. (2014a). Normalized Sisben (2002) score on horizontal axis
centered around cutoff. Higher values represent low scores (higher poverty).
with organized entities. Once again, our estimates are quite robust to the inclusion of control
variables and the choice of the bandwidth, and our magnitudes are economically meaningful.
It is interesting to note that many of the less gang-related property crimes may also be
income generating (even if they are not occupational choices), and as such it may be consistent
with Becker (1968) if we found effects on them as well. Instead, we find that in this context,
it is the decision to join a gang that seems to be the driving force. This is consistent with
information the anthropological interviews, where gangs recruit idle youth, and joining a gang
is very lucrative. The difference in coefficients between gang and less-gang related crimes are
statistically significantly different for all bandwidths.
6.3 Drug Crime
The last type of crime involves the drug trade in Medell´ın. We analyze the impact on the
probability to engage in drug-related crimes in Figure 5 and Table 6. Organized-crime related
drug arrests include the manufacturing, distribution, and trafficking of hard drugs like cocaine
and heroin. Drug crimes less likely to be related to organized entities include possession and
consumption of drugs, as these are mostly indicative of personal recreational use, along with
marijuana-related crimes.
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Table 6: Drug Crimes
Bandwidths: 4 6 10
Panel A: More Gang-Related Drug Crimes
Above Cutoff 0.00799 0.00348 0.00133
Reduced Form (0.00721) (0.00492) (0.00458)
Enrolled in SR 0.0285 0.0124 0.00461
No Covariates (0.0240) (0.0169) (0.0155)
Enrolled in SR 0.0303 0.0135 0.00524
Including pre-treatment covariates (0.0270) (0.0180) (0.0159)
Number of observations 18,463 24,857 33,851
Sample mean (men 13-26 years old in bandwidth) 0.038
Sample mean for those enrolled in SR and in high-gang comuna 0.045
Panel B: Less Gang-Related Drug Crimes
Above Cutoff -0.00976 -0.0129 -0.00788
Reduced Form (0.00774) (0.00798) (0.00629)
Enrolled in SR -0.0348 -0.0458 -0.0274
No Covariates (0.0280) (0.0293) (0.0218)
Enrolled in SR -0.0385 -0.0501 -0.0277
Including pre-treatment covariates (0.0299) (0.0329) (0.0230)
Number of observations 19,150 25,740 35,104
Sample mean (men 13-26 years old in bandwidth) 0.073
Sample mean for those enrolled in SR and in high-gang comuna 0.088
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. Tables report reduced form
and two-staged least squares (2SLS) coefficients where the first stage is SR enrollment on being below the Sisben cutoff. The Sisben
score is measured in 2002, and SR enrollment in 2005. We measure crime between 2005 and 2013. Regressions control linearly for
the Sisben score, flexibly around the cutoff. We cluster standard errors by comuna. We consider only males between 21 to 26 years
old in 2013. For regressions that have pre-treatment covariates, we include household characteristics, year of birth fixed effects,
and neighborhood fixed effects. The sample excludes anybody whose first arrest was a property or violent crime (Appendix Table
A8 includes these observations as a robustness).
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Figure 5: Gang-Related Drug Crimes
RD Graph using optimal binning procedure discussed in Calonico et al. (2014a). Normalized Sisben (2002) score on horizontal axis
centered around cutoff. Higher values represent low scores (higher poverty).
In Figure 5, even though the discontinuity in drug crime arrests is visible, and there is a
change in the slope of the relationship, the binned averages suggest a somewhat imprecise effect
at the cutoff. In Table 6 the direction of effects are what we may expect, but our results are
not precisely estimated.42 One possibility for the lack of precision is in the measurement error
associated with the classification of such crimes: the difficulty in classifying possession of drugs
as consumption or trafficking likely introduces noise. Indeed, offenses related to the trafficking
of marijuana are problematic as small amounts of personal possession were made legal during
this period. While homicides, assaults and theft produce clear evidence of crimes, encouraging
an arrest, drug crimes are often difficult to detect and record. Not having any evidence of
a crime actually being committed (e.g., a victim) may also allow authorities to under-report,
especially if cartels pressure authorities to do so.
In sum, our results indicate that the drop in formal employment as a result of the subsidized
benefits for informal workers raised the likelihood of being arrested for gang-related violent and
property crimes.43 Even as health coverage is similar across the cutoff, the costs of being in
42In Appendix Table A9 we explore an alternative specification where we look at arrests conditional on not
being in the 2009 formal sector. Here we have enough precision to measure a significant increase in gang-related
drug crimes at the cutoff.
43Note that we measure post-treatment formal employment once in the twelve year period, but crime every
year. Nevertheless, our formal employment result is also confirmed by a long literature showing similar results.
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the formal sector while maintaining coverage change discontinuously at the cutoff, prompting
individuals to avoid the formal sector. As gang-crime is a lucrative option in the Medell´ın
informal sector, we see a higher probability of arrests for gang-related crimes on one side of the
cutoff.
The magnitudes of the estimated impacts are also economically meaningful. The pattern
of results is similar but imprecise for drug crimes. Importantly, the results also show that
non gang-related crimes of each type are not impacted by SR enrollment, ruling out many
alternative mechanisms. In the following section, we investigate whether impacts are strongest
in comunas that were historically associated with high organized crime activity as further
evidence in support of our occupational choice interpretation.
7 Heterogeneity, Specification Tests and Robustness
7.1 Heterogeneity by Comuna: the Importance of Neighborhoods
Previous studies have emphasized that the opportunities in a neighborhood affect how easy
it is to induce youth into crime (Kling et al., 2005). Understanding the heterogeneity by
neighborhood helps us speak to much of the literature which relies on area-based variation.
High crime neighborhoods may have more policing and higher detection rates that may lower
the employment-crime elasticity, but may also have more opportunities to join a gang and
thereby raise the elasticity.
We investigate if comunas with a high incidence of gangs demonstrate stronger impacts
on gang-related arrests, at the RD cutoff. If the policy induces men to join organized crime,
then we may expect that neighborhoods that have more such opportunities would have a larger
impact. Figure A3 shows the spatial distribution of the locations where criminals were arrested
in the act between 2005 and 2013, by type of crime.44
We select the five comunas with the highest number of gang members captured by the
police, and create an indicator variable for whether individuals lived in these comunas in 2002,
44The red circle specifies the downtown of the city. In our main results we already show specifications that
include neighborhood fixed effects, and we cluster errors at spatial levels larger than neighborhoods. Our results
are robust to clustering at smaller spatial levels, like the neighborhood.
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Table 7: Heterogeneity by Comuna
Bandwidths: 4 6 10
Panel A: Gang-Related Violent Crimes
Enrolled in SR 0.0267*** 0.0211** 0.0150***
(0.00892) (0.00914) (0.00538)
Enrolled* Gang Comuna -0.00152 0.0141*** 0.00563
(0.00464) (0.00376) (0.00537)
F stat 90.2 154.6 232.9
Number of observations 18,052 24,272 33,027
Panel B: Gang-Related Property Crimes
Enrolled in SR 0.0344** 0.0273** 0.0190*
(0.0134) (0.0137) (0.0115)
Enrolled* Gang Comuna 0.0282 0.0364** 0.0258**
(0.0209) (0.0167) (0.0116)
F stat 86.7 145.5 249.6
Number of observations 18,426 24,740 33,625
Panel C: Gang-Related Drug Crimes
Enrolled in SR 0.0282 0.0131 0.00296
(0.0248) (0.0177) (0.0166)
Enrolled* Gang Comuna 0.000310 -0.00590 0.00690
(0.0136) (0.0135) (0.0129)
F stat 96 149.1 201.7
Number of observations 18,463 24,857 33,851
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. Tables report two-staged
least squares (2SLS) coefficients where the first stage is SR enrollment on being below the Sisben cutoff and an interaction between
high-gang comunas and being below the cutoff. The Sisben score is measure in 2002, SR enrollment in 2005, and crime outcomes
are measured between 2005 and 2013. Regressions include comuna fixed effects and an interaction between high-gang comunas and
indicators for SR enrollment. Regressions control linearly for the Sisben score, flexibly around the cutoff. We consider only males
between 21 to 26 years old in 2013. We cluster errors by comuna. The mean arrest rate across all five gang comunas are 18%,
which is also the mean arrest rate in non-gang comunas. See Appendix Table A5 for the less gang related crimes.
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our baseline year.45 These are not necessarily high crime areas, as the mean arrest rates for
young men is 18% in both gang and non-gang comunas . Yet, gang crimes make up 43% of
arrests in gang comunas , and 37% of arrests in non-gang comunas .
We interact this variable with the cutoff to analyze the heterogeneity in effects by area-
level gang activity. Table 7 presents the results. Since we have an interaction term, we report
the IV first stage F-statistics as well. The effects on crime are present in both high and low
gang-activity areas, but for property crime are larger in areas that have more gang activity.
For violent crime the interaction term is strongly positive for only one of the bandwidths. This
suggests that opportunities present in the neighborhood affect the likelihood of inducement
into organized property crime at the cutoff.
In Appendix Table A5 we show the results for less gang related crimes. Once again, there is
no evidence of SR enrollment being associated with less gang-related crimes in either the gang
comunas or the non-gang comunas . Notice, it is not that our identification strategy protects
against any increases in policing activity in gang comunas, as we are comparing one side of the
Sisben cutoff to the other. Additionally, our main tables all show a row of results that also
include comunas fixed effects.
7.2 Density Tests and Balance Tests
In our study, identification relies on the assumption that all other determinants of the outcome
vary smoothly at the cutoff. We show that an extensive set of observables display no systematic
patterns in discontinuities. In Tables A3 and A4, we show that baseline characteristics from
2002 (three years before our crime data begins) are balanced for the entire sample and for the
sample used in the regressions (young males), respectively. We consider two sets of baseline
characteristics: one for household-level socioeconomic variables, and the other for individuals.
We report estimates over the range of different bandwidths used in our main analysis: between 4
and 10 points around the cutoff. We find no evidence of systematic discontinuities in covariates
at the threshold. In the first row of Tables A3 and A4, we report a summary measure in
which we collapse these variables by taking their first principal component and repeat the same
45The top five are chosen on the criteria of having the most gang-flags as a ratio of total crimes.
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RD analysis that we do for our main results. Again, there is no detectable difference in this
composite measure of baseline characteristics, even for the largest bandwidth of 10.
Additionally, for the empirical strategy to be valid, households must not be able to manipu-
late their score to cross the cutoff. Work by Camacho and Conover (2011) highlights politically
motivated manipulation in certain municipalities in other parts of Colombia where elections
were being held. This includes both under-reporting of wealth (not necessarily a threat to
our design), but also manipulation of the final score. In other parts of the country the 1998
mayoral elections (years before our sample begins) show evidence of manipulation. We use
the raw survey data and the 2002 Sisben score only for Medell´ın, and so are less concerned
about any manipulation of the final score.46 Indeed, our tests of balance in the large set of
baseline characteristics of the household are indicative of a lack of systematic manipulation in
this context. Importantly, the cutoff for SR eligibility was determined well after the 2002 Sisben
scores were released, and as such the cutoffs were not known to anybody during the survey. As
such, we are confident that nobody could manipulate the 2002 score, even if they joined a life
of crime in later years.
We test whether there was a discontinuity in the density of scores at the cutoff for the
particular context of Medell´ın after 2002. We do this by following two methods used in the
literature: the McCrary (2008) test and a test recently developed by Cattaneo et al. (2017).
The Cattaneo et al. (2017) test yields a conventional t-statistic of 0.0489 or a p-value of 0.961,
and a robust bias corrected p-value of 0.940, confirming that there is no statistically detectable
evidence of manipulation. Figure A4 shows the distribution of the Sisben score for males
(non-criminals and criminals) and conducts a McCrary (2008) test. Note that the distribution
appears to be smooth with no evidence of bunching before the cutoff between Sisben levels 2
and 3 (red line).
46The timing of the Sisben surveys do not coincide with the Medell´ın mayoral elections, which is when some
evidence of manipulation was found in other parts of the country.
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7.3 Alternative Crime Classifications, Different Bandwidths, Spec-
ifications and Subsamples, and the Nonparametric RD
We conduct a number of robustness checks. First, we re-classify crimes into gang-related and
non gang-related groups based on the location where these types of crimes are more likely to
occur. We calculate the relative propensity of each crime in each neighborhood. The crimes
that have a higher propensity to take place in neighborhoods that were traditionally associated
with organized crime are classified as gang-related crimes. These are neighborhoods that also
have the highest proportion of gang-related flags associated with them. To be specific, we sort
the crimes by the fraction of first arrests that happen in a gang-neighborhood. The top half of
this list is classified as gang-related crimes.
This ‘Neighborhood Classification Method’ of crimes produces a list similar to the one where
we use the police generated flags, with minor differences.47 The lists of the top prevalent crimes
by classification method can be found in Appendix Table A1. In Table A6, we re-examine our
main results using the alternative classification for gang-related crimes. These results are similar
to before, with the added statistical significance of drug crimes under some specifications.
Next, we re-examine our main results using the bias-correction methods suggested by
Calonico et al. (2014a). In Table A7, we show results that conduct a polynomial bias cor-
rection at a larger bias-correction bandwidth (reported in the table). Once again, our results
show an economically and statistically significant increase in gang-related violent and property
crimes, but the effects on drug crimes are small and imprecise.
In our main specifications, when looking at a specific type of crime, we exclude arrests from
other crimes.48 In the specification shown in Table A8 we include the other categories along
with the non-criminals, and show that results are similarly robust.
As our story is about both non-formal employment and violent crime, we present a speci-
fication in Table A9 that simultaneously captures both. The advantage of our individual-level
data is that we can measure both employment and criminal behavior for the same individual.
47The big differences among the top 25 crimes is with ‘conspiracy to commit murder’ that is classified as
gang-related under the original classification but not gang-related under the neighborhood definition. Outside
the top 25 there are other differences in the definition.
48For instance, when studying violent crimes, we exclude property and drug crimes from the sample altogether.
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However, since we do not have annual data on formal employment, we use the 2009 Sisben to
measure formal employment. Here the dependent variable is an indicator that equals one when
the individual was not formally employed and arrested for a crime. Our results again show an
increase in gang-related criminal activity, with even the drug crimes now being economically
and statistically significant. This result allows us to address any concerns that the increase in
informality and increase in arrests were independent of each other.
Finally, in Figure A5 we vary the bandwidth through a much wider range – every integer
between 2 and 10. Gang-relates violent and property crimes consistently display a positive RD
coefficient, whereas drug crimes are not statistically indistinguishable from zero, even as the
coefficients are positive and fairly large for smaller bandwidths.
8 Interpretation and Alternative Mechanisms
The simultaneous decrease in formal sector employment and rise in arrests related to organized
crime supports a model in which a higher cost of being formally employed induces an occupa-
tional choice into a life of crime (Becker, 1968).49 Indeed, using the 2009 Sisben measures, we
show in Table A9 that there was an increase in individuals that were simultaneously not in the
formal sector and arrested. This result is statistically and economically significant for all gang
crimes, including drug crimes, and validates the interpretation of our results as being driven by
individual-level occupational choice across formal employment and potentially criminal activity
in the informal sector. Given the lack of effects for non gang-related crimes, it is difficult to
find alternative explanations to reconcile these results.
We consider three alternative theories. First, better health benefits at the cutoff may induce
one to engage in riskier behaviors, yet it is difficult to support why these riskier behaviors would
not also include non gang-related crimes (e.g., drug consumption). Furthermore, as health
coverage is near universal by the end of this period, individuals on both sides of the cutoff have
the same coverage, with the only difference being who pays (which depends on formal sector
employment). Indeed, the benefits themselves are quite comparable for most of this period, and
49While we do not discuss in detail specific pathways, anthropological evidence lends credence to active
recruitment by gang members of young men that ‘hang around’ in neighborhoods with idle time, and are not
in the formal sector (Baird, 2011).
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as such there are no discontinuities in healthcare at the cutoff. This suggests that the driving
force is the cost of coverage under formal sector employment.
Second, formal workers vesting more into the health system may fear losing their jobs if
arrested and reduce criminal activities as a result. However, again this should be just as true
for non gang-related crimes. Third, the police may falsely target informal workers even if they
are not criminals, but it is unlikely that they would be booked disproportionately under gang-
related crimes. Indeed, it may be easier to falsely target potential criminals for petty crime
rather than more serious offenses like homicide or auto theft. The distinction between gang
and non-gang crimes powerfully helps exclude alternative mechanisms and lends credence to
the occupational choice story we posit.
We find that a 1 percentage point fall in formal employment is related to 3.1% increase in
arrests, which lies in the lower range of recently reviewed estimates.50 Our estimates reflect
slight differences with other estimates in the literature. Becker (1968) discusses both income
and substitution effects when wages rise in one sector. For much of the other literature, job
loss or unemployment in the formal sector may produce income and substitution effects that
both accentuate criminal activity. In contrast, we may think that the gains from the subsidy
in our case may actually reduce criminal activity. Additionally, while we are directly testing
the choice of occupation, most of the related work studies reduced access to legitimate jobs as
a consequence of job losses or work restrictions, and thereby recover different elasticities.51
As our estimates are similar to those obtained from other recent causal analysis leveraging
individual-level variation (Pinotti, 2017), we interpret our results to be not only economically
meaningful, but also plausible. Yet, these magnitudes should be understood to be context-
specific. We study a high-crime environment, similar only to other developing countries and es-
pecially Latin America.52 Furthermore, we estimate a Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE)
on marginal workers in the neighborhood of an income cutoff. It is plausible that at higher
income levels, healthcare is a less important fraction of expenditures, and is less likely to in-
50A recent review by Bennett and Ouazad (2018) discusses how a 1 percentage point increase in unemployment
usually corresponds to a 3-7% increase in crime.
51Job losses and structurally imposed employment restrictions may additionally induce effects on depression,
subsequent job search, social stigma etc. whereas our variation in relative costs of employment should not.
52Recent evidence from Latin America suggests much larger employment-crime elasticities (Dell et al., 2018;
Dix-Carneiro et al., 2018).
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duce such behavior. Finally, it should be noted that the newly induced marginal criminals may
be unlike the average criminal along many dimensions, including ease of avoiding arrests, and
as such our results may not be widely generalizable for other sub-populations. Nevertheless,
since the exogenous probability of getting caught conditional on committing a crime has no
reason to be discontinuous at the cutoff, our estimates are unbiased even in the presence of
such heterogeneity in criminal “skill.”
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we highlight an important fact: disincentivizing formal employment can lead to
substantial increases in criminal activity when informal opportunities include employment by
organized criminal entities. We evaluate this claim in the context of the high-crime environment
of Medell´ın, Colombia. We first provide strong evidence showing that the criteria behind the
health benefits policy led to a sharp decrease in formal sector employment. At the margin, the
policy raised the opportunity cost of formal-sector employment and induced workers to join the
informal labor market.
In Medell´ın, this informal market contains significant opportunities related to organized
crime. We follow these same individuals over a decade and show that this decrease in formal
sector employment led to an increase in the probability of being arrested for organized-crime
related activities. On the other hand, crimes less likely to be associated with criminal eco-
nomic enterprises, like crimes of impulse or opportunity, show no such impacts at the eligibility
threshold, lending credence to the occupational choice mechanism we advance. Together, our
simple calculations suggest that as the policy pushed workers out of the formal sector, a mean-
ingful fraction of these workers were drawn into organized crime. These effects were largest in
neighborhoods that had, at baseline, greater opportunities to join organized crime.
Crime deterrence may have limited benefits if the supply elasticity to criminal activity is
high (Freeman, 1999). Investigating the decisions behind choosing a life of crime, as we do
here, is essential in the fight against crime. Importantly, our work speaks to the determinants
of engaging in criminal activity at the individual level. The strength of our approach is that we
do not need to use area-based variation or disequilibrium shocks like job-losses to identify the
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occupation choice between individual employment opportunities and crime. We do this using a
unique data set that matches the census of arrests with socio-economic outcomes over a decade,
in the context of one of the most violent cities in the world. We find a source of exogenous
variation generated by policy rules, and use a regression discontinuity design to estimate our
effects.
We conclude that Colombia’s well-intentioned and broad-based subsidies for healthcare had
the unintended consequence of incentivizing gang participation by way of its distortionary
provision rules. The program being important for providing subsidized health access to low
income families implies that there is little reason to do away with it. Yet, the formality-clause
governing the selection into the program may be distortionary, and as such warrant further
examination.53
Removing the emphasis on informality (but still targeting the poor) may negate the increase
in criminal activity around the cutoff. The costs underlying such a change would be a larger
fiscal burden as even low-income formal sector workers would be eligible for SR. The benefits,
on the other hand, are far reaching: less crime, less policing and incarceration, and less negative
externalities on families and children. This has important welfare implications for the design
of many such programs across the developing world which often have far-reaching and under-
studied consequences on seemingly unrelated outcomes and behaviors. Our results provide
guidance for how impactful improving access to and incentives for formal sector employment
can be for deterring criminal activity.
53Recognizing these adverse effects, policy-makers lowered the costs of CR enrollment at the end of our study
period, when Law 1607 was enacted, leading to a significant increase in formal sector employment (Bernal et al.,
2017; Kugler et al., 2017; Morales and Medina, 2017).
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Online Appendix: Additional Tables and Figures
Figure A1: Timeline of Data Used
Figure A2: Distribution of Age at Arrest (Males)
Source: Polic´ıa Nacional de Colombia. Vertical lines represent ages 13 and 26.
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Figure A3: Location of ‘in-the-act’ arrests by type of crime, 2005-2013.
Source: Medina and Tamayo (2011) using Polic´ıa Nacional de Colombia. Dots indicate arrests. Bold lines are neighborhood
boundaries. Red circle is downtown.
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Figure A4: Sisben score Distribution (All Males).
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Source: Sisben survey of 2002. The figure includes all males (i.e. both non-criminals and arrested individuals). The left panel
shows the histogram and the right panel conducts a McCrary (2008) test.
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Table A1: List of Top Crimes by Data-driven Classifications
Crime Type Gang Flags Neighborhood Method
Drug Consumption / Possession Drug No No
Drug trafficking / Distribution - Marijuana Drug No No
Drug trafficking / Distribution Drug Yes Yes
Drug trafficking / Distribution - Cocaine paste Drug Yes Yes
Drug trafficking / Distribution Heroin Drug Yes Yes
Use of Fake Identification, false document Property No No
Motor vehicle theft (Motorcycles) Property No No
Receiving Bribes (as officials) Property No No
Copyright/Fraud Property No No
Identity Theft Property No No
Fraud Property No No
Theft / Assault Property Yes Yes
Robbery (To Businesses, firms) Property Yes Yes
Property Vandalism Property Yes Yes
Motor Vehicle Theft - Cars Property Yes Yes
Burglary Property Yes Yes
Simple Assault/Battery Violent No No
Rape/Sexual Assault Violent No No
Conspiracy to commit murder Violent Yes No
Homicide Violent Yes Yes
Extortion Violent Yes Yes
Assault / Battery - Against Police Violent Yes Yes
Manufacture, Trafficking Firearms / Weapons Violent Yes Yes
Intimidation and Stalking Violent Yes Yes
Terrorism Violent Yes Yes
Kidnapping Violent Yes Yes
List of top crimes by type and gang classification, out of 103 crimes. The ‘Gang Flags’ lists whether or not the crime has a high
propensity to receive a police reported flag of gang-related at the time of arrest. The ‘Neighborhood Method’ classifies crimes that
have a high propensity to be in neighborhoods that also receive a higher fraction of gang-related flags at the time of arrest.
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Table A2: Formal Employment By Gender
Bandwidths: 4 6 10
Panel A: Men Formal Employment in 2009
Enrolled in SR -0.0539*** -0.0411*** -0.0301***
(0.0166) (0.0103) (0.00811)
Number of observations 133,067 180,742 247,886
Panel B: Women Formal Employment in 2009
Enrolled in SR 0.00560 -0.0130* -0.0169*
(0.00757) (0.00786) (0.00889)
Number of observations 156,942 213,755 292,980
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. We use the Sisben survey
of 2009 to construct formal employment. Tables report two-staged least squares (2SLS) coefficients where the first stage is SR
enrollment on being below the Sisben cutoff. Regressions control linearly for the 2002 Sisben score, flexibly around the cutoff. We
cluster standard errors by comuna.
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Table A3: Baseline (2002 Sisben Survey) balance tests
Bandwidths: 4 6 10
First Principal Component 0.0184 -0.0023 0.0282
(0.0158) (0.0191) (0.0234)
Years of Education 0.0183 0.00248 -0.0408
(0.0685) (0.0606) (0.0453)
Age 0.0339 0.0255 0.0177
(0.0469) (0.0300) (0.0239)
Age Specific Education Gap 0.00566 0.0159 0.0580
(0.0613) (0.0602) (0.0435)
HH Head Years of Education -0.0463 -0.0832 -0.105**
(0.0652) (0.0592) (0.0451)
Unemployed 0.0166* 0.0113 0.00971
(0.00878) (0.00738) (0.00726)
Married 0.0161 0.0275 0.0307***
(0.0228) (0.0175) (0.0106)
Employed -0.00846 -0.0115 -0.0182**
(0.0129) (0.0102) (0.00760)
Attending School -0.000226 0.000756 0.000217
(0.00247) (0.00270) (0.00221)
Neighborhood Stratum 2 -0.00551 -0.0129 0.00394
(0.0215) (0.0144) (0.0110)
Neighborhood Stratum 1 0.0199 0.0236* 0.00311
(0.0201) (0.0126) (0.00955)
Own House 0.0249 0.0218 0.0192**
(0.0159) (0.0127) (0.00789)
Less than 6 years Olds 0.00783 0.0131 0.0201*
(0.0104) (0.0129) (0.0113)
HH Head Age -0.000226 0.000756 0.000217
(0.00247) (0.00270) (0.00221)
Observations 181,132 246,974 340,581
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. Tables report reduced form
coefficients on being below the Sisben cutoff, where Sisben score is measured in 2002. Regressions control linearly for the Sisben
score, flexibly around the cutoff. All variables are measured in 2002. We cluster standard errors by comuna. Neighborhood strata
indicate the official socioeconomic strata of the neighborhood. First Principal Component takes the first principal component of
all other variables.
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Table A4: Baseline (2002 Sisben Survey) balance tests, Male Youth.
Bandwidths: 4 6 10
First Principal Component 0.0174 -0.00246 -0.0158
(0.0603) (0.0446) (0.0300)
Years of Education 0.0411 0.0275 -0.0247
(0.0629) (0.0552) (0.0401)
Age 0.0132 0.00976 0.00376
(0.0129) (0.0113) (0.00913)
Age Specic Education Gap -0.0321 -0.0208 0.0260
(0.0590) (0.0600) (0.0415)
HH Head Years of Education -0.0167 -0.0560 -0.0840*
(0.0647) (0.0583) (0.0436)
Unemployed 0.0179** 0.0111 0.00924
(0.00846) (0.00697) (0.00737)
Married 0.0171 0.0254 0.0314***
(0.0227) (0.0175) (0.0109)
Employed -0.0204** -0.0139 -0.0123
(0.00968) (0.0106) (0.00998)
Attending School -0.000356 0.000788 0.000270
(0.00241) (0.00271) (0.00224)
Neighborhood Stratum 2 -0.00588 -0.00299 0.00571
(0.00932) (0.00713) (0.00626)
Neighborhood Stratum 1 -0.00118 0.00362 -0.00524
(0.0163) (0.00916) (0.00796)
Own House 0.0116 0.00752 0.0114*
(0.0147) (0.0110) (0.00646)
Less than 6 years Olds 0.00745 0.0122 0.0187
(0.0103) (0.0126) (0.0112)
HH Head Age 0.341* 0.338** 0.220**
(0.167) (0.136) (0.100)
Observations 21,366 28,675 38,888
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. Tables report reduced form
coefficients on being below the Sisben cutoff, where Sisben score is measured in 2002. Regressions control linearly for the Sisben
score, flexibly around the cutoff. All variables are measured in 2002. We cluster standard errors by comuna. Neighborhood strata
indicate the official socioeconomic strata of the neighborhood. First Principal Component takes the first principal component of
all other variables.
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Table A5: Less Gang-related Crimes: Heterogeneity by Comuna
Bandwidths: 4 6 10
Panel A: Less Gang-Related Violent Crimes
Enrolled in SR 0.00886 0.00333 -0.00421
(0.0167) (0.0114) (0.0123)
Enrolled* Gang Comuna 0.00773 0.00236 0.0126
(0.0240) (0.0150) (0.0144)
F stat 92.6 134.6 204.3
Number of observations 18,419 24,768 33,702
Panel B: Less Gang-Related Property Crimes
Enrolled in SR -0.00571 -0.00526 -0.00503
(0.0168) (0.0120) (0.00969)
Enrolled* Gang Comuna -0.0176 -0.0122 -0.0100
(0.0180) (0.0153) (0.0122)
F stat 100.2 161.8 241.4
Number of observations 18,240 24,523 33,358
Panel C: Less Gang-Related Drug Crimes
Enrolled in SR -0.0379 -0.0494 -0.0292
(0.0299) (0.0307) (0.0222)
Enrolled* Gang Comuna 0.0132 0.0155 0.00281
(0.0292) (0.0211) (0.0195)
F stat 94.8 135.1 197.3
Number of observations 19,150 25,740 35,104
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. Tables report two-staged
least squares (2SLS) coefficients where the first stage is SR enrollment on being below the Sisben cutoff and an interaction between
high-gang comunas and being below the cutoff. The Sisben score is measure in 2002, SR enrollment in 2005, and crime outcomes
are measured between 2005 and 2013. Regressions include comuna fixed effects and an interaction between high-gang comunas and
indicators for SR enrollment. Regressions control linearly for the Sisben score, flexibly around the cutoff. We consider only males
between 21 to 26 years old in 2013. We cluster errors by comuna. The mean arrest rate across all five gang comunas are 18%,
which is also the mean arrest rate in non-gang comunas.
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Table A6: Neighborhood Classification Method
Bandwidths: 4 6 10
Panel A: Gang-Related Violent Crimes
Enrolled in SR 0.0171** 0.0121* 0.00891**
(0.00751) (0.00684) (0.00387)
Number of observations 17,995 24,198 32,931
Panel B: Gang-Related Property Crimes
Enrolled in SR
0.0335** 0.0271** 0.0192*
(0.0131) (0.0122) (0.0107)
Number of observations 18,426 24,740 33,625
Panel C: Gang-Related Drug Crimes
Enrolled in SR 0.0284* 0.0108 -0.00197
(0.0163) (0.0126) (0.0115)
Number of observations 18,909 25,447 34,661
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. Tables report two-staged
least squares (2SLS) coefficients where the first stage is SR enrollment on being below the Sisben cutoff. The Sisben score is
measured in 2002 and SR enrollment in 2005. Crime data are from 2005 to 2013. Results use the neighborhood classification
method described in the text to classify crimes. Regressions control linearly for the Sisben score, flexibly around the cutoff. We
consider only males between 21 to 26 years old in 2013.
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Table A7: Semi-parametric RD with Bias Correction
Type of Crime Violent Property Drug
Enrolled in SR 0.0164 0.02794 0.00768
Standard error (0.00972) (0.01636) (0.02069)
Bias corrected p-value 0.077 0.052 0.57
Bandwidth 5.2 5.8 6.6
Bias correction bandwidth 9.9 8.9 9.6
Number of observations 24,206 26,511 29,102
Note: Results using the Calonico et al. (2014a) CCT method for estimation, where the primary estimation uses a linear functional
form and the bias correction uses a quadratic form. Tables report fuzzy RD two-staged least squares (2SLS) coefficients where the
first stage is SR enrollment on being below the Sisben cutoff, where Sisben score is measured in 2002. Crime data is from 2005 to
2013. We consider only males between 21 to 26 years old in 2013.
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Figure A5: Robustness to Bandwidths (Gang-Related Crime)
Note: Coefficients of RD 2SLS regressions where the first stage is SR Enrollment on being below the Sisben cutoff.
Sample of gang-related crimes only. Grey bars indicate 90% confidence intervals. Red lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.
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Table A8: Robustness Check: Including Other Crimes in the Sample
Bandwidths: 4 6 10
Panel A: Gang-Related Violent Crimes
Enrolled in SR 0.0213*** 0.0195*** 0.0136***
(0.00718) (0.00676) (0.00416)
Number of observations 21,720 29,235 39,877
Panel B: Gang-Related Property Crimes
Enrolled in SR
0.0320*** 0.0289*** 0.0204**
(0.0100) (0.00998) (0.00894)
Number of observations 21,720 29,235 39,877
Panel C: Gang-Related Drug Crimes
Enrolled in SR 0.0238 0.0107 0.00405
(0.0195) (0.0138) (0.0129)
Number of observations 21,720 29,235 39,877
Note: The sample includes other crimes. For instance, when looking at violent gang-crime arrests as the outcome of interest,
property crime, drug crime and violent non-gang crime arrests are also in the sample grouped with the people never arrested in this
period. Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. Tables report two-staged
least squares (2SLS) coefficients where the first stage is SR enrollment on being below the Sisben cutoff. Regressions control linearly
for the Sisben score, flexibly around the cutoff. We consider only males between 21 to 26 years old in 2013.
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Table A9: Simultaneously both Non-formally Employed (in 2009) and Arrested
Bandwidths: 4 6 10
Panel A: Gang-Related Violent Crimes
Enrolled in SR 0.0104 0.00997** 0.00990**
(0.00771) (0.00405) (0.00436)
Number of observations 12,015 16,023 21,733
Panel B: Gang-Related Property Crimes
Enrolled in SR
0.0393** 0.0331*** 0.0183
(0.0184) (0.0122) (0.0128)
Number of observations 12,244 16,319 22,074
Panel C: Gang-Related Drug Crimes
Enrolled in SR 0.0207 0.0299*** 0.0291**
(0.0177) (0.00983) (0.0126)
Number of observations 12,253 16,368 22,199
Note: The outcome is arrests only for those not formally employed as measured in 2009. We exclude all arrests post 2009. Standard
errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. Tables report two-staged least squares (2SLS)
coefficients where the first stage is SR enrollment on being below the Sisben cutoff. The Sisben score is measured in 2002, and SR
enrollment in 2005. Crime is measured between 2005 and 2009. Regressions control linearly for the Sisben score, flexibly around
the cutoff. We consider only males between 21 to 26 years old in 2013.
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